It is my claim that the naturalized epistemology interpretation of Hume’s skeptical solution adequately answers Salmon’s worry and, through my own interpretation, justifies the “serious gap”. I will do this by explaining what the “gap” could be, how this “gap” plays an important role in explaining how understanding works and why it is not an indication of irrationality.
A successful inductive argument justifies its conclusion only if we are independently justified in accepting the principle of the uniformity of nature or PUN. The principle in question infers that there are inherently two sides to all things. Anybody can accept that there exists an up and down, forward and back, light and dark, limited and unlimited, odd and even, one to many, male and female, resting and moving, straight and curved. In geometry a line is defined by two points or two circles(Lundy, p. 14). Even in physics with hot and cold, entropy and order, positive and negative charges, the PUN stands. My claim has 3 stanzas: One, principles of the uniformity of nature can be justified by supporting it with deductive claims and are not solely dependent upon inductive claims, two, the PUN still stands but understanding is gained when supplemented by deductive claims and , finally, that Salmon’s worry is unfounded because the “gap” is merely the expansion of human capacity to learn and is not an indication of irrationality.
When considering the merits of inductive processes, it is paramount to understand what we are saying.
The very nature of the word induction contains the in-prefix. This prefix alludes to the negative, or opposite, form of another. For example; indecisive, inadequate, inexpensive and inorganic. This means there must be something to be compared with.
The word deduction contains the de-prefix. This alludes to the necessity of a precluding entity. Words like; derive, decompose, define, deregulate. These words infer that we; not, do the opposite of or undo. The word is constructed to be related to another word. This seems, to me, to be heavy nod to my previous statement about dualism being a PUN.
Thus our language has an effect upon our logical precession of exploring the merits of inductive reasoning based upon principles of the uniformity of nature. What is this opposite to which the prefix “in” in induction alludes to? The only opposite to which makes logical sense in this context is the process of deduction. The twoness of these words point at each other and are seemingly diametrically opposed. So it is my argument that inductive processes hold no merit unless held up to the light of deductive processes and vise versa.
Keeping in mind the reference inductive and deductive processes have with one another, let’s explore why there seems to be such a gap between the two processes. It is natural for us to make an object of the other when considering the merits of one. We place ourselves on opposite sides of this coin to evaluate the other side. ‘It is there, other, that not this, and essential as a basis for comparison, the method by which our minds know things’(Lundy, p. 14), we fall into the same inductive cycle of logic. The presupposition that the two are separate. The idea that these two methods can hold up on their own is ludicrous. We depend upon these two methods in order to expand our selves. This is the very mechanism to which we obtain knowledge. In this sense, empirical knowledge does arise from a way of life (custom and habit) but does follow a set of rules. Habits and customs in this case being empirical methods/findings and the rules of logic linking our findings, through deduction, to ourselves or the one.
Just as a telescope can see further as its diameter gets larger, so too does our capacity for knowledge work. As we gain more knowledge, our ability to analyze an idea by taking opposing positions grows. Creating a vast gap between our inductive analysis and our deductive analysis. The larger the cavern is the more certain we become of what is or isn’t true.
Thus, the “gap” remains in a not so serious manner but a useful one. The claim that science has no ground on which to maintain its cognitive superiority to any form of irrationality, however repugnant, holds true. In that, cognitive superiority does not come from the results or methods of science but from how well science can link empirical findings with deductive findings. Science does not have a monopoly on this method or rationality. Sometimes irrationally linking two inductive statements to the point of contradicting itself. Spending more time analyzing its own empirical findings without attempting to link them to deductive ones.
Just as quantum mechanics can tell us things about astronomy, so too can astronomy tell us things about quantum mechanics. Without bridging the gap between the two, we can still learn things about one or the other. To imply that the very large and the very small operate on different rules would be irrational and allude to the lack of the uniformity of nature.
Sources:
Lundy, M. (n.d.). Quadrivium (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Bloomsbury USA. - PAGE 14